A “Just Hearing”: Reading Shyam Selvadurai’s The Hungry Ghosts as Counter to State Practice by Rodrigo, Arun Nedra
IA “Just Hearing”:
Reading Shyam Selvadurai’s The Hungry 
Ghosts as Counter to State Practice
Arun Nedra Rodrigo
n the human condition, Hannah Arendt claims that “The 
chief characteristic of this specifically human life . . . is that it is 
itself always full of events which ultimately can be told as a story, 
establish a biography; it is of this life, bios as distinguished from mere 
zoe, that Aristotle said that it ‘somehow is a kind of praxis’” (97). To 
have the capacity to narrate one’s life story is to be welcomed into the 
fold of humanity. Fleeing a space where one’s rights were denied, as 
many refugees do, does not then reduce one to the status of zoe; rather, 
in possessing the capacity to narrate one’s life story, one enters as bios 
into a larger political context limited to the practices not of one nation 
but of humanity as a whole. Giorgio Agamben, on returning to the 
Greek roots of contemporary democratic traditions, argues that to speak 
of a zoe politike would not make sense, and what was in question for 
Plato and Aristotle was “a qualified life, a particular way of life” (Homo 
Sacer i). Only bios were accorded rights and the articulation of principles 
to the political community. In other words, while zoe could designate a 
mode of life, only bios could alter it, because only bios could endow that 
life with meaning through its narration.
The request for a narrative, in the immigration documents that refu-
gees are required to fill out within fifteen days of arriving on Canadian 
soil, seems on the surface to extend that possibility of an articulation of 
selfhood. Stepping out of the interrogative mode of answering binding 
legal questions that comprise the bulk of these forms, whose import 
refugees might not fully comprehend, they can see themselves emerg-
ing instead into the body politic, through recognition of their subjec-
tive experiences and political decisions to immigrate, in the request for 
their own narratives. However, the constraints placed on the form in 
which refugees can narrate their life experiences, and the compulsion 
under which they can narrate those experiences, diminish their capacity 
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to endow their experiences with complex meanings. The generic con-
straints of immigration forms, and the process of the refugee hearing, 
borrowing as it does from the Christian practice of the confessional, 
present modes and conditions of representation that cannot fully allow 
for an articulation of complex historical, political, and personal events. 
Instead, they serve the self-endorsing practices of the state in its main-
tenance of sovereignty both juridically, in the ordering of the narra-
tive process, and culturally, through the reification of the European 
Christian traditions of the settler cultures of Canada. These intersec-
tions of culture and law, where meanings are made and unmade, are 
important precisely because they reveal the ways in which symbolic 
forms are tied to relations of power (McClennen and Slaughter 7). It 
is in these intersections that the refugee is reinstated as a minoritized 
subject.
In seeking refuge, the refugee also seeks justice, but the compul-
sion to speak in the mode of another, in the conditions determined by 
another, can hardly lead one to narrate oneself adequately in the pursuit 
of justice. This formulation echoes Jacques Derrida’s question about 
how one can distinguish between the force of law and violence deemed 
unjust, for the very compulsion under which such laws are enacted can 
lead to aporias in the pursuit of justice (“Force of Law” 6, 23-27). The 
refugee hearing, in its attempt to order an often confusing and complex 
network of meanings and relations created by states that fail to uphold 
the social contract, is mobilized as a discursive practice that indulges 
in epistemic violence by silencing narratives that do not endorse its 
own normative framework. The connections between the techniques 
and forms of power for which they are produced are not analyzed, and 
the hearing becomes a form of Orientalist discourse (Said, Covering 
Islam 151). Geographically based oppositional categories are thus cre-
ated in which less privileged nations are depicted as threatening spaces 
that breed terrorists who intend to harm the inhabitants of privileged 
nations.
This essay focuses on the narrative demands made via the Personal 
Information Form (PIF) on Sri Lankan Tamil refugees who arrived in 
Canada between 1983 and 2009, at the height of the civil conflict in Sri 
Lanka, to draw attention to the ways in which it reinstated the refugee 
as a minoritized subject. I then turn to Shyam Selvadurai’s novel The 
Hungry Ghosts to explore the ways in which it can serve as a critical 
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intervention in the hearing process, allowing refugees to document and 
make truth claims in their histories of trauma, giving their experiences 
more complex meanings. In keeping with Paul Gready’s claim that the 
“unique truth practices and repertoire available to the novel as a genre” 
allow readers to explore “uncomfortable truths” in matters pertaining 
to human rights conflicts (156), I would argue that in some instances 
the novel provides a more “just hearing” for the refugee.
Set in Sri Lanka and Canada between the early 1980s and the mid-
1990s, The Hungry Ghosts closely parallels much of the period when the 
PIF was employed for Tamil refugees arriving in Canada. In the PIF, 
refugees play the role of documentarians of trauma because they have 
to give meaning to their experiences if they are to be judged “genu-
ine.” Refugees have to correspond to the state’s version of “truth” while 
proving that they are “right” in their judgments of the past. However, 
produced under compulsion and within the constraints of the PIF, the 
truth claim potential of the refugee narrative is denied because it decon-
structs itself in the service of the state and is limited to meanings that 
endorse state practice. In this context, the genre of the novel can offer 
both truth claims that critique state practice and forms of meaning 
that allow for the working through of specific trauma in the pursuit of 
a “just hearing.”
In positioning a reading of The Hungry Ghosts in this manner, I do 
not imply that the novel is irrevocably tied to a particular historical 
moment, nor do I expect fiction to take the place of legal frameworks. 
That would be an injustice to the novel as an art form in the first case 
and fall into a relativism of perspectives that do away with the possibil-
ity of redress in the second. However, as an art form that engages with 
the public imagination, the novel brings forms of meaning into cultural 
practice and can thereby effect change in the practice and interpretation 
of justice. In this I concur with McClennen and Slaughter’s assertion 
that, “if literature and culture can be said to ‘work,’ maybe they work 
in the long term — that is, much of the imaginative and social work 
that literature does is done over time and space and is done through the 
forms of stories that enable forms of thought, forms of commitment, 
forms of being, and forms of justice” (11). Selvadurai’s protagonist, like 
Selvadurai himself, did not go through a refugee hearing and does not at 
first see himself as a refugee. However, by the end of the novel, Shivan 
comes to inhabit ontologically the condition of a refugee, revealing the 
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extent to which juridical practices seep into the public imagination and 
shape cultural practice. In The Hungry Ghosts, characters straddle worlds 
both real and ghostly in attempts to endow their pasts, and thereby their 
presents, with meanings that have thus far been wrested from them by 
statist violence. It is in these worlds of meaning that they find agency, 
accountability, and a form of “justice” not bound by the juridical prac-
tices of the state. In contrast to the refugee narratives elicited by the 
state, under constraint and compulsion, the form and content of The 
Hungry Ghosts allow the refugee to enter the body politic as bios through 
a complex engagement with trauma and truth claims that counters the 
self-endorsing practices of the state.
Self-Endorsing Juridical Practice
To understand why the novel can provide a more just hearing, it is 
necessary to examine the ways in which the refugee hearing process, 
in both its written and its oral requirements, fails in its aspiration to 
provide justice. In 1987, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the 
necessity for oral hearings in recognition of the inadequacy of written 
refugee status claims (Singh v. Minister). The defendants were granted 
the rights to fundamental justice; additionally, they were granted the 
right to security of the person and the right to a fair oral hearing. In 
doing so, the Supreme Court gestured to natural law and to human 
rights, those held outside the bounds of citizenship. However, prior to 
a hearing, and within a month of initiating a claim, refugee claimants 
had to fill out a generic PIF that consisted of a number of questions 
pertaining to their identity and a section entitled “Narrative” to estab-
lish their credibility in writing. Although, for the purposes of this essay, 
and to address the experiences of Tamil refugees arriving in Canada 
between 1983 and 2009, I engage with the now defunct PIF, it is worth 
noting that its current replacement, the Basis of Claim, is a longer 
form that requires extensive details about refugees’ travel routes, osten-
sibly to expose human traffickers. Thus, the concerns of the refugee 
have become sidelined in the revised form by the concerns of Stephen 
Harper’s Conservative government. At a gathering of Conservative sup-
porters at the Deer Creek Golf Club, on 17 August 2010, the prime 
minister was quoted as saying, “I think Canadians are pretty concerned, 
when a whole boat of people comes, not through any normal application 
process, not through any normal arrival channel, and just simply lands. 
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And obviously this leads to significant security concerns” (“Detention 
Hearing”). The current focus on human trafficking is reminiscent of 
the prejudicial practice of the “continuous journey” requirement, which 
proved to be fatal to so many passengers aboard the Komagata Maru, 
and is worth reflecting on. Reinforcement of the idea of the continuous 
journey as “normal process” and “normal channel” taints the refugee 
with criminality and terrorism while eliding the tiered juridical system 
that it would create. Through such culturally accepted norms, opposi-
tional categories are created1 wherein developing nations are depicted as 
spaces that breed terrorists who threaten the security of well-meaning 
Canadians.
Although the PIF’s interrogative mode puts the claimant on the 
defensive, suggesting a discursive link between criminality and the con-
dition of being a refugee, the introduction of a narrative space suggests 
the possibility of empathy by the reader. A marked shift occurs in the 
narrative space from the legal contractual language that articulates the 
“rights of the citizen” to an informal language embedded in subjective 
experience that articulates the “rights of man.” In this space, claimants 
come to understand refuge as a human right and the narrative as an 
assertion of that right and a reinsertion of themselves into the political 
body. They can thus see themselves as bios, narrating their lives and pos-
sessing the capacity to alter the body politic. It is at this point that the 
constraints placed on the narrative make its most radical articulations 
impotent, and the PIF acts as what Derrida terms a “supplement” that 
“intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of”; it fills “as if one fills a 
void” (Grammatology 145). Contextual information and the subjective 
interpretation of events, which would constitute a “thick” description, 
are left out, for the imposition of a legal, rational structure on the nar-
rative requires that the claimant focus on “thin” rather than “thick” 
description (Walzer). The refugee is thus reinstated as zoe, rather than 
bios, insofar as the narratives of refugees are taken out of their hands 
and they are rendered speechless, though with a voice. The distinction 
between voice and speech parallels that between zoe and bios, because 
zoe can express (voice) himself or herself, but meaning (speech) can only 
be attributed to bios. It is of interest to note, with Agamben, that zoe 
cannot be pluralized. One can interpret that to mean that zoe is inca-
pable of forming or seeing himself or herself as part of a community and 
therefore cannot hope to transform a community by engaging with it 
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meaningfully. Refugees, prompted for facts that correspond with dates 
and events that can be corroborated, are reduced to the conditions of 
bare life. They are no longer viewed as having histories drawn from sub-
jective experiences or histories at all, for that matter, for history is more 
than the mere enumeration of events. The narrative, Donald Galloway 
claims, is expected to be complete, true, and correct, while the prioriti-
zation of “just-the-facts” ensures that the information provided by the 
claimant cannot be contextualized or interpreted (4-5). Furthermore, 
the two pages provided for the narrative imply that a clear and objective 
account can and should be presented within that space, though more 
pages can be used should the need arise. This might leave claimants 
wondering if the use of additional space suggests any particular extra-
textual readings of the veracity of their accounts: whether they would 
be interpreted as exaggeration, embroidery, or even inability to function 
adequately in the language and thereby make potential immigrants 
undesirable. The current Basis of Claim form must be filled out in a 
shorter period of time, fifteen days, and like the PIF it provides limited 
space for the narrative; clearly, changes to the form have not been for 
the better.
The expectation that victims of persecution can provide succinct 
causal analyses of the political events relevant to their sufferings, and to 
distinguish and prioritize the events most relevant from those less rel-
evant, asks much of people who have often been systematically excluded 
from the political process and might have suffered considerable trauma. 
To complicate matters further, when claimants attempt to be objective, 
and create accounts that conform to what they deem to be the criteria 
of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), their accounts might 
come into question for seeming to be too detached. The process does 
not take into account the pressure on a refugee to produce a narrative 
that corresponds with the self-endorsing expectations of Immigration 
Canada, nor does it allow for the difficulties inherent in producing a 
sufficiently personal account under the given constraints. As Galloway 
suggests, “The underlying message appears to be that a Board Member 
is entitled to suspect that the claimant was not personally involved if 
he or she does not try to offer a unique perspective on the occurrences 
in question. Absence of any reference to subjective experience suggests 
falsity” (7). Yet, when claimants attempt to reduce their narratives to 
those that they are led to believe will be relevant to the reader (tallies 
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of facts), they are almost certain to leave out vital information on and 
details of their subjective experiences.
The written account thus appears as a paradoxical performance, on 
the one hand constrained by the framework of legal language, most 
clearly demarcated by the appendix to the PIF, and subscribing to a 
paradigm of objectivity, on the other hand requiring that the subjective 
experience of suffering and persecution still glimmer between the lines. 
All of this while suspending the writer in uncertainty, requiring that the 
account be written “cold,” with no sense of whether the reader is willing 
or able to follow the experience inscribed therein.
During the oral hearing that eventually follows submission of the rel-
evant documents, the refugee claimant is questioned in person about the 
information given in the PIF, including the narrative. On the surface, it 
appears that the introduction of “demeanour” as a factor in the decision-
making process reaffirms that the written account is deemed inadequate 
to reflect the claimant’s subjective experience (Galloway 24). However, 
suspicions about the accuracy of interpreting “demeanour” turn the 
hearing into an interrogation during which claimants must show their 
ability to stick to their stories, to demonstrate their consistency and thus 
their credibility. Not surprisingly, Sean Rehaag’s research on acceptance 
rates of refugee status points to huge disparities among board members, 
with several being close to zero in their acceptance rates. This suggests 
that “demeanour,” primarily interpreted by the judge, is an inaccurate 
source of information subject to the vagaries of personal bias, cultural 
practices, and cues with which the judge might be unfamiliar. In addi-
tion, research on the capacity of judges to draw accurate conclusions 
based on “demeanour” indicates that the judges most confident of mak-
ing accurate determinations tend to be the least accurate (Porter and 
ten Brinke 60-63). The constraints placed on the written narrative and 
the burdens of its evidentiary value are made even more problematic by 
such revelations. Although the format of the hearing, modelled on the 
procedures of the criminal trial, encourages the view that refugees must 
defend their claims, we should remember that refugee claimants ought 
not to be expected to defend themselves. They are not on trial.
Self-Endorsing Cultural Practice
The refugee hearing is shaped by legal definitions and precedents found 
in both immigration law and criminal law; however, its self-endorsing 
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character is derived not purely from its juridical practices but also from 
their religious genealogy via Canada’s European “founding cultures.” 
It can thereby be read as a technique of discipline designed to produce 
cultural “docile bodies” while extending the promise of citizenship as 
an ultimate recuperation or redemption. Although a discourse of order-
ing and classifying is applied to the refugee hearing, however unsuc-
cessfully, it is even more troubling to note its parallels to the religious 
model of the confessional, as examined by Michel Foucault. The secu-
larized displacement of the sacred in the scientistic enumerations of 
the state is rendered paradoxical through the symbolic re-enactments 
of sacred practice: a reminder of the refugee’s condition as homo sacer, 
when juridical power derives its legitimacy from the sacred (Agamben, 
Homo Sacer). There are numerous parallels between the Foucauldian 
reading of the sexual confession and juridical practices in the refugee 
hearing. In his analysis of the confession, Foucault identifies the induce-
ment to speak, the postulation of causality, intrinsic latency, methods 
of interpretation, and the medicalization of effects as ways in which 
the exhortation of confession came to be constituted in scientific terms 
(65-73). Examining the hearing in this light, it appears that, in the first 
instance, the claimant is induced to narrate his or her condition through 
scribal and verbal documentation. In addition, the claimant’s narrative 
is deployed as a system of decipherable signs and symptoms, with the 
claimant’s memories expected to fit neatly into this system. The claim-
ant is then cross-examined by a refugee hearing officer, who holds what 
is deemed to be up-to-date data on the political climate of the claimant’s 
country of origin and measures the statements made against those data.2 
UN declarations notwithstanding, the hearing can be regarded as legiti-
mate only if it is built on the notion that there is universal agreement on 
what constitutes persecution and that these definitions are sustainable 
regardless of geographical location.
In the hearing, refugees are induced to tell everything, with the 
help of an interpreter if necessary, to establish causal links between 
their own behaviour and the actions of the group or government that 
has persecuted them, and to help establish causal networks of action 
and reaction as if to ascertain whether they were in any “real” danger. 
Ethnicity becomes endowed with an inexhaustible and polymorphous 
causal power, such that the conflicts in Rwanda and Sri Lanka were 
interpreted solely as ethnic conflicts, as if questions about resources 
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or the monopoly of capital were irrelevant. This begs the question of 
whether ethnicity is considered by the Canadian government to be a 
valid cause of persecution. The latency expected to be uncovered is a 
tendency toward violence somehow intrinsic to ethnicity. The question 
of latency is especially troubling given the current discourse on terror 
and the association of particular ethnic or religious groups with terrorist 
tendencies. Consider the incredulity with which “homegrown” terror is 
treated in the media and pronounced as something expected to grow 
elsewhere. It is a process that essentializes groups of people from select 
geographical areas as being hostile and destructive to the West, very 
similar to processes that Said described as “self-correcting, self-endorsing 
disciplines that state the normative” (Covering Islam 143). The IRB thus 
reinforces the link between ethnicity and “natural” belonging, which 
government practices, enabled by the proposed Bill C-51, for instance, 
serve to entrench further.
According to Foucault’s fourth criterion, truth attains its comple-
tion only via the judge/confessor who records and condemns or acquits. 
The truth resides not in the claimant as subject but in the judge as 
transcendental Subject, the master of truth. The judge performs a her-
meneutic function by deciphering the truth of the confession, in many 
instances with incomplete and self-endorsing information provided by 
the persecuting government/forces, by Canadian nationals appointed 
to diplomatic posts, or by NGOs. To put it simply, the judge declares 
“what actually happened,” much like priests have “unearthed” sin and 
psychologists have “unearthed” sexual deviance. Refugee claimants do 
not possess truth or confess truth as known to them; rather, they enter 
into subjectivization through a process of psychic self-mutilation that 
begins with the reformulating, editing, and rationalizing of their his-
tories and experiences. The act of seeking refuge is reduced in this way 
from a political act committed by bios to an act of desperation commit-
ted by zoe. The refugee, whose life is carved up by violence and narrowly 
defined legal documents, is reduced to bare life in the discursive process 
of the refugee hearing, in which “truth” emerges from the process of 
recounting the written narrative and the cross-examination that follows.
Finally, the hearing is also codified to perform a therapeutic function 
insofar as it is intended to redeem the refugee from his or her position 
as homo sacer and recuperate him or her into civil society and the role 
of citizen or bios. Thus, the domain of citizenship is normalized, and 
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the condition of statelessness is pathologized. The significant differ-
ence between the confessional and the hearing is that, after a successful 
hearing, a waiting period, and the catechism of a citizenship test, the 
successful claimant must pledge allegiance to Canada. The potential 
for harm when refugees are induced to speak when they are not ready 
or able to do so is skilfully portrayed in The Hungry Ghosts, in which 
forced disclosures by Shivan have destructive consequences for him and 
his lovers. At the same time, Selvadurai unveils the fantasy of recupera-
tion after disclosure as being just that, a fantasy. Redemption is offered 
neither by state nor by family but by the arduous path that he decides 
to undertake at the end of the novel.
Where my examination of the hearing as disciplinary practice 
departs from the symbolic and internal repression delineated by 
Foucault is in the recognition that these practices also possess an insti-
tutional materiality (Poulantzas 76-92). State practices possess meaning 
and value because they are accompanied by a universalized discourse 
on the legitimacy of the state’s monopoly of violence. The state’s cap-
acity to produce consent via forms of domination is possible, as Nicos 
Poulantzas asserts, because “state-monopolized physical violence perma-
nently underlies the techniques of power and mechanisms of consent” 
(81). The refugee hearing finds its undergirding meaning precisely in 
the state’s capacity to detain refugees in camps or detention centres and 
in its capacity to deport and denaturalize. Although the lack of avail-
able resources is given as the most pragmatic reason for the inability to 
accommodate every request for citizenship, the current discourse on 
terror adds an element to the judicial forensics of the refugee hearing. 
Ontological and epistemological distinctions are set up between the 
peace-loving and governable North Americans and the potential ter-
rorism of the other, very similar to the Orientalist discourse that Said 
described (Orientalism 2). The refugee immigrant is thereby tainted 
and, even after receiving citizenship, remains “unsettled.” This leads to 
the formation of ghetto communities with the same attendant stressors, 
such as the Tamil communities in Scarborough, exemplified by the one 
close to Bridlewood Mall in The Hungry Ghosts. Selvadurai presents the 
Tamil boys who live close to the mall as being unsettled and unheard, 
carrying on their shoulders heavy burdens of anxiety.
The parallels between deviance and the condition of the refugee 
need to be examined for two reasons. The first is the need to critique 
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the techniques and frameworks employed by the hegemonic discourses 
of the nation in excess of which the criminal, the non-heteronormative, 
the insane, and the refugee exist. The second is the revelation regarding 
those techniques and frameworks by those who see through them or 
outside them. In the words of Agamben, “If in the system of the nation-
state the refugee represents such a disquieting element, it is above all 
because by breaking up the identity between man and citizen, between 
nativity and nationality, the refugee throws into crisis the original fic-
tion of sovereignty” (“We Refugees”). The refugee narrative, a narrative 
of trauma, possesses the potential for intervention, both as historical 
text and as testimony, when it serves to uncover the violent practices 
behind the state’s claim to sovereignty in its encounter with the state’s 
monopoly of violence. However, given that the refugee narrative pro-
duced under the constraints of the state’s monopoly of violence serves 
primarily to endorse state practices, one might consider the possibilities 
of the novel as a critical intervention in the pursuit of a “just hearing” 
for the refugee.
The Novel as Truth Claim
Some of the most remarkable contemporary fiction written in North 
America, such as Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Wayson Choy’s Jade Peony, 
and Eden Robinson’s Monkey Beach, dwells on the themes of haunting 
and possession through the inheritance of trauma of historically mar-
ginalized groups. Canada and the United States have been built on the 
labour, oppression, and erasure of vast numbers of people, and a critique 
of biopolitics in these states must address their inheritance of trauma. 
However, a distinction needs to be made between the ahistorical trauma 
that becomes part of the cultural inheritance of North Americans and 
the historically specific trauma, with perpetrators held to account, such 
that the working through of trauma is not delayed or deferred. A failure 
to make such distinctions prevents critical intervention by the refugee, 
serving instead the hypostatizing practices of the state in its mainte-
nance of sovereignty and its myth of undivided origins, wherein the 
refugee suffers from what Dominick LaCapra describes as “a constitu-
tive loss or lack which may as well be a secular variant of original sin” 
(xiv). If one is born into the “original sin” of non-correspondence with 
the absolute foundation of national ethnicity and its myths of undivided 
origins, the refugee serves as a reminder of that trauma, disrupting both 
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the absolute foundations and the totalizing solutions of the transhis-
torical nation. In other words, the refugee unveils the obsolescence of 
the modern nation by breaking up the identity between nativity and 
nationality.
The Hungry Ghosts falls well into the genre of the roman à clef, draw-
ing on the political turmoil in Sri Lanka and Selvadurai’s own experi-
ences as an immigrant in Canada. The novel shifts back and forth 
in time, through the childhood memories and current struggles of its 
protagonist, Shivan, the child of a marriage between a Sinhala woman 
and a Tamil man. The death of Shivan’s father drives his mother, Hema, 
back to the household of his authoritarian grandmother, Daya. Having 
grown up in poverty and subject to the dictates of her extended family, 
Daya protects herself through her unceasing accumulation of wealth and 
property, often at the expense of marginalized and vulnerable people. 
Her husband’s death leaves her unfettered to pursue her avarice, and 
her thug Chandralal aids her in this pursuit. When Daya takes a liking 
to Shivan and grooms him to be her heir, he finds himself thrust into 
a world of ethical quandaries from which he cannot extricate himself. 
Unable to challenge his grandmother’s hypocrisy — Daya consistently 
makes danas (“offerings”) to the Buddhist temples to appease her guilt 
— Shivan persuades his mother to emigrate to Canada after the riots 
of 1983. His intentions are not entirely pure either, driven as much by 
his hope for acceptance of his sexual orientation as by his need to get 
away from his grandmother’s control. Although he recognizes that he 
is protected from the ethnic violence by his grandmother’s wealth and 
her Sinhala last name, he cannot fully identify with her ethnic privilege, 
her unscrupulously acquired wealth, or, for that matter, her plans for 
his future.
In Shivan, Selvadurai has created a protagonist who is not an 
embodiment of virtue, and his growth as a character perhaps gains 
greater depth because of it. As a child, Shivan is petulant and selfish, 
and as a young adult he pursues his desires at great risk to others, espe-
cially Mili, whose association with Shivan leads to his death. Shivan is 
aware of the patriarchal power that he possesses as his grandmother’s 
heir and his mother’s male child. His dreams of emigrating to North 
America arise not from any concern for his vulnerable mother, or for 
his unrecognized brilliant sister Renu, but from his belief that he can 
be his true self there: “Once in America, I told myself, I would become 
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the person I really knew myself to be” (57). Caught up in his fantasies 
of finding acceptance as a gay man and being lauded for his wit, he 
pressures his mother to emigrate to Canada. Since emigration would 
also liberate them from his grandmother’s control, his mother agrees in 
spite of his sister’s protests. Selvadurai is unapologetic in his exploration 
of the patriarchal power that Shivan possesses but also reveals that this 
power is contingent on his remaining in the closet, both as a gay man 
and as a Tamil. His Tamil patronymic marks Shivan, even though he 
enjoys the privileges afforded by his grandmother’s wealth and his moth-
er’s decision to have him educated in Sinhala. He witnesses the violence 
that erupts around him in July 1983, but from within the enclosure of 
his grandmother’s property, protected by her golayas (“thugs”):
One day, the Tamil houses on the roads around ours went up in 
flames. For a few hours in the afternoon we could hear the roar and 
crackle of fire, the crashing of furniture being destroyed. Once, a 
woman screamed, a gargled sound so chilling it haunts me to this 
day. The air was rancid with smoke and we walked around with 
handkerchiefs pressed to our noses, coughing and gagging when it 
was at its worst. In the evening, bits of ash floated into my grand-
mother’s garden, settling on her f lowers. (65)
Shivan is traumatized by the sound of the woman’s scream, which con-
tinues to haunt him, but like the rest of his family he chooses not to ask 
his grandmother’s thug Chandralal how and why they remained safe. 
“Perhaps we didn’t want to know,” he admits (66). Although Shivan’s 
need to escape this oppressive situation is easily understood, it is also 
easy to understand that such a narrative, in which violence that cannot 
be easily reduced to ethnic conflict takes place in a complex network of 
kinship, capital, and patronage that blurs the demarcations of victim, 
colluder, and perpetrator, would not fit within the frame of decipherable 
signs and symptoms of the PIF.
Having come out to his family in Canada and engaged openly in 
short-term relationships, when Shivan returns to Sri Lanka his naïveté 
and burgeoning sexual confidence lead him to ignore or dismiss the 
warnings of his Sri Lankan friends to end his relationship with Mili or 
to keep it hidden. He pursues Mili with an aggressiveness that forces 
him out of the closet in a society that views homosexuality as a crime 
and the gay male as expendable. Mili’s death can also be attributed 
to the broader normalization of violence carried out by the govern-
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ment of Sri Lanka. The mundaneness of state-sponsored paramilitary 
forces, death squads, and disappearances creates the ideal circumstances 
in which civilian vendettas can be carried out. Mili’s murder is easily 
disguised and his body disposed of by men who are accustomed to 
brutality. Such complex webs cannot be expressed in the causal frame-
work posited by the PIF, and certainly extrajudiciary killings are often 
difficult to verify via information exchanged between sovereign states. 
Mili’s death is also a crime that cannot be brought under the umbrella 
of ethnic violence, since Mili was Sinhalese and murdered by Sinhalese 
thugs. Although the protection of minority rights ought to be a vital 
concern in legal discourse, the assumption that the interests of minority 
groups can be determined solely or primarily along ethnic or racial lines 
becomes increasingly unsupportable. There is no denying the shared 
experiences of oppression among historically marginalized groups; how-
ever, the assumptions that their interests can be uniformly expressed, 
and that redress can be uniformly applied, ignore the existence of min-
orities, whether identified on the basis of caste, class, gender, or sexual 
orientation, within those minorities and diversity among the oppressed 
in general. In representing this diversity, the novel points to a constitu-
tive lack in the foundation of the nation, in which the ideal subject must 
be both undiluted in ethnicity and heterosexual in order to reproduce 
national identity.
Where the homosexual is deemed to be deviant because the homo-
sexual body cannot be deployed by a heteronormative state, refugees 
are deemed to be deviant because their identities cannot be deployed 
by the fundamentalist state in which they were born, and they carry the 
taint of violence that threatens to disrupt the statist narratives of their 
adopted land. Selvadurai troubles the idea of national identity in its con-
structs of categories such as “immigrant” and “refugee” by paralleling 
instances in which the homosexual and the refugee are marked as devi-
ants. The distinction between the immigrant and the refugee as onto-
logical categories is highlighted when Shivan first makes contact with 
a gay man in Toronto. The man asks him if he is a refugee, and Shivan 
replies, “‘No, I came here with my family. We’re immigrants’” (97). 
This seemingly innocuous statement can be read in a number of ways. 
It demonstrates the class distinctions among the waves of political refu-
gees who arrived in Canada with families and resources, as Selvadurai 
himself did, and refugees who often arrived alone, with scant resources, 
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sent abroad by families desperate to protect their lives. Shivan and his 
family are given visas in Colombo after filling out forms and being 
interviewed to determine their desirability as immigrants, a test that 
they appear to pass easily. This is certainly a far cry from the experiences 
of the refugees who arrived on the MV Sun Sea, for instance.3 It is also a 
far cry from the experiences of the boys who live near Bridlewood Mall: 
“The young men spoke no English, and some of them had never been 
outside their village. The boys’ forced hilarity and sliding sheepish eyes 
suggested the heavy burden on their shoulders” (109).
The term “refugee” categorically distinguishes desirable immigrants, 
like the English-speaking Shivan, from undesirable immigrants, like the 
sheepish Tamil-speaking boys. His reluctance to identify with the boys, 
for whom he clearly feels sympathy, while also feeling superior to them, 
is a reflection of his class privilege. A more generous interpretation of his 
rejection of the term “refugee” can also be attributed to a form of sur-
vivor’s guilt: a reluctance to claim a term associated with the suffering 
that Shivan had encountered only indirectly by that point. Although the 
novel allows for both possibilities, the statement also serves as a marker 
of a historical moment in Canada. It is a moment when a shift occurs 
in the framing of refugees, from potentially desirable immigrants to 
undesirable immigrants tainted with violence and, post 9/11, terrorism. 
Although Shivan can initially reject such a categorization, he comes to 
inhabit it ontologically as a man who is both Tamil and homosexual. 
Even though he first comes to Canada as a privileged “immigrant,” he 
returns from his visit to Sri Lanka as a “refugee.” The burdens that he 
senses on the shoulders of the Tamil boys foreshadow his own “heavy 
load” at the end of the novel. While the Tamil boys have known all 
along their condition as refugees, no doubt having gone through the 
refugee claim process, Shivan comes to inhabit that category ontologic-
ally through his failed attempts to shed the past and live what he sees 
as a normal life. What little protection his class privilege offers him 
from racist state practices is revoked in his experience of racist cultural 
practices as he makes his first forays into the gay community.
The Hungry Ghosts takes the model of the coming-out narrative 
and applies it to the refugee, who must come to terms with a category 
viewed as deviant. Shivan negotiates being “closeted” as a homosexual 
in Sri Lanka and “closeted” as a Tamil refugee in Canada for fear of 
the physical and psychic violence that might arise from his admission 
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of certain truths about himself. In doing so, he learns to disregard his 
own trauma, until he is reminded of it when he listens to the activist 
Sriyani speak at an event at a Canadian university (276-277). Shivan 
has learned to live with his trauma by retreating to a “numb, quiet 
place” (277) and tolerating the vague references to and codifications 
of his deviant identity until circumstances compel him to “out” him-
self. The linguistic codifications that parallel the conditions of the 
homosexual and the refugee are expressed through elliptical phrases 
and shorthand that seek to avoid confronting the “unspeakable.” His 
grandmother, for example, cannot speak of his homosexuality: “‘That 
Jayasinghe boy, taking my obedient, innocent grandson and changing 
him into this grotesque . . .’ She made a disgusted sound. ‘I cannot even 
say the word’” (222). Similarly, both Shivan and Michael cannot speak 
of the taint of violence that Shivan carries as a refugee: “Terms like 
‘your mother’s issues,’ or ‘1983’ became a shorthand between us for that 
history, and he explored [it] no further. I think he understood, without 
daring to articulate it to himself, that to press for more information, 
to look more keenly at my odd family relations, would be to confront 
the disparities in my story — and that the truth, once revealed, would 
take us where, in the end, it did” (318). His fear of rejection, were his 
deviance to be revealed, turns out to be well founded, and his relation-
ship with Michael deteriorates rapidly when Shivan finally reveals the 
truth. Michael cannot overcome the sense of betrayal that he feels, 
and he cannot understand the role that trauma has played in Shivan’s 
secrecy. Even more significantly, he voices an all-too-familiar kind of 
anxiety: “‘You brought your grandmother and your fucking lover into 
my life, into my apartment. You’ve soiled it with these people. I don’t 
even know what they look like, and I’ve been living with them for the 
past two years’” (341).
Similar refrains resonated throughout the Toronto area in 2009 dur-
ing the Tamil protests against the slaughter of Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
News reports were full of bystanders asking why “these people” could 
not leave their problems back home. The implication was clear that the 
undivided origins of the nation were being ruptured in this reference 
to a past marred by violence and forced displacement. Michael cannot 
reconcile himself to Shivan’s past, in part because Shivan’s relationship 
with Mili was ended by force. He cannot be certain that Shivan does 
not still long for Mili or draw comparisons between him and Mili — 
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comparisons in which he inevitably falls short of the ideal lost love, 
eternal and unchanging in memory. The parallel with the public notion 
that one cannot have “true patriot love” for Canada if one brings one’s 
problems along, easily drawn here, reveals another instance of state prac-
tice that seeps into the public imagination. Michael thinks that his life 
has been “soiled,” an interesting word that connotes the soil of a nation 
being soiled by bloodshed, even if that bloodshed happens elsewhere. 
Shivan has internalized the anxiety of being soiled, or tainted, himself: 
“My past has tainted Michael, changed him from the man who opened 
his door, his life, to me two years ago, wearing that ridiculous batik shirt 
to impress. He has become someone he does not recognize” (370). The 
decision to return to Sri Lanka and work through his karma/trauma is 
reached in part by the realization that he and Michael can never return 
to the idyllic lives that they had lived while he remained closeted as a 
refugee.
Selvadurai’s novel cannot be read as offering closure, either in its 
working through of trauma or in its truth claim. Shivan is aware of the 
discourses around him that do not, and perhaps will not, accept his 
revelations as “truth.” He fears placing his life before another who will 
act as transcendental subject, and his fears prove to be justified. His 
life, open to the interpretation of others, is presented back to him as 
something twisted and deviant. Far from allowing him any redemptive 
release, both instances of “coming out” under inducements to speak lead 
to the loss of a loved one and to suffering that he comes to accept as his 
karmic burden. Selvadurai’s decision to reject the Christian promise of 
redemption after confession and penance for the Buddhist practice of 
expiation is an interesting and apt one when viewed in the light of the 
refugee hearing. As Selvadurai says in an interview with the National 
Post, “To me, it seems a saner way to live your life than to believe you 
can go to confession, say five Our Fathers and six Hail Marys, like I 
did as a Catholic, and then that’s it, you’re free of sin. Well, you’re not. 
You’re not. You have to take responsibility for it” (“Shyam Selvadurai”).
In paralleling refugees and homosexuals as “deviants,” Selvadurai’s 
novel also serves to uncover the ways in which sovereign power borrows 
its legitimacy from the epistemes and symbols of the sacred. Shivan’s 
choice to accept accountability for his actions and to take on an act 
of dharma and sacrifice can be read as a rejection of the foundational 
Christian epistemes of his adopted nation and the narrowly defined 
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Protestant-Buddhist epistemes of his nation of origin. Although the 
choice of Buddhism as a spiritual path of healing might appear on the 
surface to reify the identity of the Sinhala state, by choosing to refer to 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as rebels rather than ter-
rorists, Selvadurai ruptures the correspondence of that identity as well 
as the legitimacy of the state’s monopoly of violence. The activist Sriyani 
presents a critical view of the LTTE in the talk that Shivan attends 
(207), but the narrative voice of the novel maintains the term “rebel” 
and thereby moves away from the discourse on terror that has tainted 
the most vulnerable of refugees. In an interview with NOW Magazine, 
Selvadurai reveals that it was a conscious decision to tell a story dif-
ferent from the one that “the government is trying to shove down our 
throats” (“Shyam Selvadurai’s The Hungry Ghosts”). It is a strategy that 
works as well in challenging the Canadian legal-juridical processes that 
have turned the refugee hearing into a trial as it does in challenging the 
fundamentalist narratives of the Sri Lankan government.
Although the idea of justice is never overtly described as such, it 
permeates the novel through the characters’ belief in karma. The novel 
is interspersed with Buddhist fables that speak to the persistence of the 
karmic burden. Daya is fond of narrating them, and Shivan holds on 
to these stories as a means of coming to terms with his own struggles. 
While Daya attempts to expiate her guilt through monetary offerings 
to both Buddhist and Hindu temples, unshakable in her conviction of 
her moral superiority in the face of her family’s pain and resentment, her 
family members bear the brunt of her coldness and cruelty. The idea of 
offerings as absolution is repeatedly challenged in the novel, for instance 
when, in a moment of anger, Hema lashes out at her: “‘I have hated 
every minute in this house, and so have my children. Never mind your 
past life, you will pay for this cruelty in your future life. And no amount 
of bana and danas and donations for bells and ropes at the temple will 
make up for what you have done’” (72). The working out of karma is 
seen as complex and non-linear and not leading to a form of harmony 
or clear-cut resolution. In one of his narrations of his grandmother’s 
stories, Shivan discloses that “Denouements are often long in Buddhist 
stories and are, in fact, the point of the tale: Actions are easy to per-
form, but working off the karmic effects of those actions takes a long 
time” (261). It is telling that this disclosure arrives after a story of two 
wives who pursue and destroy each other’s children over several lifetimes 
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until they learn from the Buddha that vengeance cannot cleanse past 
wrongs. The concept of justice in The Hungry Ghosts is removed from 
the state-endorsed construct of fundamentalist Buddhism as an oppres-
sive religion with its attendant moral ascendency, as ref lected in the 
character of Daya, who attempts to order her surroundings through her 
practice. Justice is reinstated instead in a form of Buddhism that func-
tions as spiritual practice that requires attention to deeds in the present 
and pursuit of expiation for deeds of the past. Haunted by past wrongs, 
Daya refuses to relinquish control over her daughter and grandchildren, 
rewarding and punishing them for what she believes they have done 
for and to her. Her family members exist as means to her own karmic 
ends, and as such she cannot recognize that they might have their own 
desires and sorrows.
In rejecting his grandmother’s path, Shivan rejects the narrative of 
the nation that deploys its subjects as means to its own self-endorsing 
ends. When he accepts his fate, he feels his mind become light, “as if 
released from a sharp and overwhelming pain” (371). In choosing his 
own path, Shivan moves away from a model of absolute resolution and 
toward a more complex sense of agency, gaining the ability to work 
through his trauma through service and compassion. In this complex 
working through of trauma, and the revelations afforded by truth claims 
that cannot be produced under the constraints and compulsion of state 
practices, The Hungry Ghosts gives the reader a sense of what it means 
to really hear a refugee voice. However, in more than one instance, it 
reminds the reader of the multiple layers of truth and meaning not 
revealed or resolved. Resolution is something to work toward rather than 
assume. In the final moments of the novel, Shivan refers to the “heavy 
load” that he bears, and in this way Selvadurai reminds us of the Tamil 
boys who live near Bridlewood Mall, whose burdens have always been 
heavy, and whose stories are still unheard.
Notes
1 The Harper government’s current attempts to introduce Bill C-51, the “Terrorism 
Bill,” are further evidence of such oppositional discourses that would criminalize critiques 
of the state.
2 The current “Revocation of Persuasive Decisions” pertaining to Sri Lanka on the IRB 
website reveals that the recent changes in Sri Lanka are no longer considered “meaningful 
and durable.” The evidence on which previous decisions were made has ceased to be valid. 
Shyam Selvadurai 203
This revocation came into effect in the same year (2012) as the Basis of Claim form, which 
attempts to uncover human trafficking. The implications for refugees shortly after the 
massacre of Tamils in the northern province of Sri Lanka in 2009 were obvious: at their 
most vulnerable, they had to contend with the Canadian government’s “sound reasoning” 
that meaningful and durable change had been made in the country from which they were 
f leeing, and thereby they had no cause to seek refuge.
3 In 2010, the MV Sun Sea arrived on the shores of Vancouver carrying 492 people 
detained by the Canadian authorities under suspicion of terrorist activity. Angus Reid polls 
at the time showed that large numbers of Canadians wanted them deported even if these 
suspicions proved to be unfounded, as they did for all but one individual.
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